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Non-technical summary
The tragedy of little Madeleine in 2007 did not only catch the headlines of the pub-
lic media but was also followed with interest by researchers after the remarkably
successful donation acquisition of the desperate parents. To finance a costly search
for their taken daughter, they asked the British population for donations. Pre-
sumably unconsciously they benefited of the so called "identifiable victim effect"
because society is willing to spend far more money to save the lives of identifiable
victims than to save statistical victims (Jenny und Loewenstein, 1997).
In the literature this effect has up to now been investigated in laboratory experi-
ments and in surveys. Studies indicate that identifiable victims evoke more intense
feelings than more inclusive ones. In our study we investigate the effect in a field
experimental setting and are especially focussing on measuring support in terms of
monetary donations.
For the experiment we cooperated with a German charitable organization which
promotes primary medical health care in five developing countries. Together with
the organization we framed two versions of a solicitation letter that was sent to
57,325 households as part of the yearly winter mailing campaign. Within the
"baseline"-group recipients were asked - as in previous mailings - to donate any
desired amount to the organisation. Potential donors in the "choice"-group were
beyond that given the possibility to select a particular country (or more countries)
as donation recipient.
In line with the effect of the identifiable victim we expect higher donations when
one explicit object of benevolence can be chosen for a donation. The reference
group can thus be reduced from the whole population of five countries to one
particular country. Our hypothesis was that, although the victim is in this case
not as identifiable as in the case of Madeleine, this weak identifiable victim effect
could lead to higher donations.
Overall, 6,709 study relevant donations were received by the organization in the
observation period between December 3rd, 2007 and January 31st, 2008, adding up
to an amount of more than 1 million Euro. The response rate was 11.7% for both
groups. Within the "choice"-group, 3.4% of the donors made use of the selection
possibility and donated to a particular country. Such donors donated with an
average amount of 160 e significantly more than those donors who did not select
a country for their donation (135 e).
The organisation additionally provided us with data of their two previous winter
mailing campaigns that allowed us to observe the donation behaviour of households
over time. Under inclusion of the donation history we deduced that households that
donated to a particular country in 2007 did not donate differently in previous years
than did those donors who did not select any country for their donation in 2007.
This supports our hypothesis that the different average amounts in 2007 stem from
our treatment manipulation and not from random or selection biases.
Our study emphasizes that charitable organisations can benefit from giving donors
more precise information of how the donated money will be used. The probable
reason is that altruistic action seems to be mediated by aroused empathetic emo-
tions. People give in order to do something good for the victims and/or themselves.
But the intensity of the emotions which might be expressed by the height of the
donation seems to depend on factors that can be influenced, e.g. in terms of more
detailed information with respect to the donation purpose.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die Tragödie der kleinen Madeleine sorgte im Jahr 2007 nicht nur in der Öf-
fentlichkeit für Aufsehen, sondern wurde im Zuge der durch die Eltern erfolgreich
praktizierten Spendenakquirierung auch von Forschern interessiert verfolgt. Um
die Suche nach ihrem im Urlaub verschwundenen Kind finanzieren zu können, hat-
ten die Eltern die britische Bevölkerung um Spenden gebeten. Dabei nutzten sie
(vermutlich unbewusst) den "Effekt des identifizierbaren Opfers", denn Menschen
sind tendenziell eher bereit, einem speziellen, bekannten Opfer anstatt einem un-
bekannten, anonymen Opfer zu helfen (Jenny und Loewenstein, 1997).
Bislang ist dieser Effekt in der Literatur in Laborexperimenten und in Umfragen
untersucht worden. Studien deuten darauf hin, dass identifizierbare Opfer stärkere
emotionale und moralische Reaktionen hervorrufen als nichtidentifizierbare Opfer.
In unserer Studie untersuchen wir diesen Effekt erstmals in einem Feldexperiment
und nutzen dafür Geldspenden als ein Maß für Unterstützung.
Für das Experiment kooperierten wir mit einer deutschen Spendenorganisation,
die sich in fünf Entwicklungsländern für medizinische Grundversorgung einsetzt.
Zusammen gestalteten wir im Rahmen der jährlichen Winterspendenaktion zwei
unterschiedliche Versionen eines Spendenbriefs, der per Post an insgesamt 57.325
Haushalte versendet wurde. In der Gruppe "baseline" wurden die potentiellen
Spender - wie in den Vorjahren - gebeten, eine Spende an die Organisation zu
überweisen. In der Gruppe "choice" erhielten die Spendenbriefempfänger darüber
hinaus die Möglichkeit, ihre Spende konkret an ein bestimmtes Land (oder auch
an mehrere) zu entrichten.
Im Sinne des Effekts des identifizierbaren Opfers erwarten wir ein höheres Spenden-
aufkommen, wenn ein Land explizit für die Spende ausgewählt werden kann. Die
Referenzgruppe kann so von fünf Ländern auf ein Land reduziert werden. Unsere
Hypothese war, dass, obwohl das Opfer in diesem Fall nicht so eindeutig identifizier-
bar ist wie im Fall Madeleine, bereits dieser schwache Effekt des identifizierbaren
Opfers zu höheren Spenden führen könnte.
Im Zeitraum vom 3. Dezember 2007 bis 31. Januar 2008 gingen bei der Organisa-
tion 6.709 studienrelevante Spenden mit einem Gesamtvolumen von über 1 Million
Euro ein. Die Antwortquote lag für beide Versuchsgruppen bei etwa 11,7%. Unsere
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 3,4% der Spender in der "choice"-Gruppe die Selektions-
möglichkeit nutzen und die Spende einem bestimmten Land zuführen. Dieser Anteil
der Spender spendet im Durchschnitt mit ca. 160 e signifikant mehr als diejenigen,
die für ihre Spende kein Land explizit auswählen (135 e).
Zusätzlich stellte uns die Organisation Daten aus vergangenen Wintermailings
(2005 und 2006) zur Verfügung, so dass wir das Spendenverhalten einzelner Haushal-
te über die Zeit untersuchen konnten. Unter Einbeziehung der Spendenhistorie
ermittelten wir, dass Haushalte, die in 2007 an ein bestimmtes Land spendeten,
in den Jahren zuvor nicht anders als diejenigen spendeten, die in 2007 kein Land
bei ihrer Spende auswählten. Dies unterstützt unsere Hypothese, dass die un-
terschiedliche Höhe der Spende in 2007 durch unser Experiment und nicht durch
mögliche selektive oder zufällige Verzerrungen zustande kommt.
Alles in allem unterstreicht die Studie, dass Spendenorganisationen davon profi-
tieren können, wenn sie einen genaueren Einblick darüber geben, für welchen Zweck
sie ihr Geld einsetzen. Der wahrscheinliche Grund ist, dass altruistisches Handeln
durch Emotionen beeinflusst wird: Menschen spenden, damit sie sich und/oder
den Opfern etwas Gutes tun. Aber die Intensität der Emotionen, möglicherweise
ausgedrückt in der Höhe der Spende, hängt auch von beeinflussbaren Faktoren ab,
wie z.B. von detaillierter Information bezüglich des Spendenzwecks.
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Abstract
In a large natural field experiment, we explore the effect of provid-
ing donors with the opportunity to choose the target country for their
donations. We find that only a small fraction of donors use the op-
tion, which might reflect a reluctance to consider tradeoffs when those
concern important, `protected', values. However, those donors who
choose their object of benevolence give significantly more, even when
controlling for their donation history. In view of the latest research
on identifiable-victim effects, our findings underline that less inclusive
targets can evoke more intense feelings than more inclusive ones 
stressing that altruistic motivation seems to be mediated by aroused
empathetic emotions.
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1 Introduction
Charitable giving has been in the focus of experimental research lately (e.g.,
Falk (2007), Carpenter et al. (2008), Corazzini et al. (2009) or Bernasconi
et al. (2009)). (Not only) these studies stress that charitable activities play
an important role in economies. Many of these activities are financed by
charitable organizations, which in turn usually rely on voluntary donations.
The amount of such donations is quite substantial (e.g., in 2008, Americans
gave approx. $308 billion to charitable causes).1 The supported charitable
organizations are, for various reasons, frequently rather specialized in their
activities. For example, some support children, while others support elderly
people, or medic programs in developing countries, or wildlife, etc. Even if
the organization engages in more than one activity, the most common way
to raise funds is to send solicitation letters that ask for donations to a single
activity. Interestingly, however, the organizations usually do not discriminate
with respect to the countries that the donors can support. In this paper, we
shed light on the effect of providing donors with the possibility to choose the
target country for their donations.
To study our research question, we conducted a randomized field experi-
ment. The Doctors for Developing Countries sent out more than 57,000
solicitation letters by mail in two different versions. In the one version, po-
tential donors could donate to the organizations' main purpose only - the
project work in five different developing countries. The other version pro-
vided donors with the possibility to select one or more particular countries
as donation recipients. The organization received 6,709 donations in total in
response to the appeal for funds. We find that, overall, 3.4% of all donors
1source: Giving USA Foundation, Center on Philanthropy, Indiana University.
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in the treatment group make use of the selection possibility. Those who use
the option, i.e., who state a recipient for their donation, give significantly
more. On average, their donations are 18% higher. Furthermore, controlling
for the donation activity of the two previous winter mailings indicates that
this difference indeed stems from our treatment manipulation and is unlikely
to be a result of selection bias or chance.
The observation that many people prefer to share their donations equally
among the target countries instead of choosing a single recipient might reflect
a reluctance to consider tradeoffs when those concern important, `protected'
values (cp. Ritov and Baron (1999)). Nevertheless, we find that some donors
do choose their object of benevolence and that their donation is significantly
above average. This result demonstrates that subjects' valuation can be
higher for a subset than for a more inclusive target. A possible explanation
might be that the less inclusive target evokes more intense feelings than
the more inclusive one (cp. Kahneman and Ritov (1994), Kogut and Ritov
(2005)); e.g., in our case it might be that a donor has more intense feelings
towards a particular country, maybe because he has some specific link to it.2
This suggests that altruistic motivation seems to be mediated by aroused
empathetic emotions (see also the empathy-altruism hypothesis by Batson
et al. (1991), or the evidence provided by Cialdini et al. (1987), Batson
(1987), or Batson and Coke (1981)). This in turn might inform the economic
literature trying to model altruism (e.g., Andreoni (1990), Harbaugh (1998),
Ariely et al. (2009)).
2Take, for example, the case of saving human lives: would you like to decide between
saving the life of n persons in Bangladesh or in Kenya? The answer is likely to depend
on your attitude towards the two countries. Maybe your relatives live in Kenya or you
had positive experiences during a visit to Kenya, in which case you might have stronger
empathetic emotions and thus prefer to help people in Kenya and give more than if you
had to share your donations between Bangladesh and Kenya.
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Our study is also closely related to the empirical research investigating the
effects of identification on benevolence and helping behavior (e.g., Fetherston-
haugh et al. (1997), Jenni and Loewenstein (1997), Bohnet and Frey (1999),
Small and Loewenstein (2003), Brosig et al. (2003)). Starting with Schelling
(1968), these studies (backed up by casual empirical observations) support
the idea that people care more about identifiable, or `familiar', victims than
about statistical victims. Several potential causes are recognized for inducing
the identifiable victim effect, e.g., vividness, uncertainty, or the proportion
of the reference group that can be saved. Basically, however, the mediating
factor behind the effect seems to be evoked emotions. Identifiable victims
evoke stronger emotional and moral reactions than (equivalent) unidentifiable
victims (cp. Kogut and Ritov (2005), who find that self-reported sympathy
towards the victim and willingness to help the victim are correlated). Our
results point into the same direction, but the difference is that the informa-
tion set provided by us is kept constant between the two solicitation letters.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge the existing evidence up to now ei-
ther stems from questionnaire studies (e.g., Jenni and Loewenstein (1997))
or from the lab (e.g., Güth et al. (2007), Andreoni and Petrie (2004)), but
not from a controlled field experiment.
The observation that people sometimes act as if the whole is less than the
sum of its parts (VanBoven and Epley (2003)) has also been made in other
domains, in particular in connection with contingent-valuation methods. It
seems as if people are regularly prone to an `unpacking effect' (cp. Rottenstre-
ich and Tversky (1997)) or a `part-whole bias' (cp. Kahneman and Knetsch
(1992), Diamond and Hausman (1994), Bateman et al. (1997)) when apprais-
ing events or evaluating categories.3 We add to this literature by demon-
3For example, Kahneman and Ritov (1994) report that subjects' (hypothetical) will-
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strating that the effect not only exists in (hypothetical) contingent-valuation
scenarios. Even in (actual) decision situations, people sometimes act as if
their preferences were non-additive.
2 Experimental Design and Behavioral Predic-
tions
The charity: In order to explore the effect of providing donors with the
possibility to choose the target country for their donation in a natural field
experiment, we searched for a charitable organization that operated in at
least two (sufficiently different) countries. Moreover, we required the orga-
nization's work in these countries to be similar4 and wanted to cooperate
with an organization that was sufficiently large and reliable to provide us
with a large and detailed data set. Fortunately, the German organization
Doctors for Developing Countries (Ärzte für die dritte Welt, DfDC in the
following) agreed to cooperate with us. The DfDC is officially certified by the
German Donation Seal and is listed there amongst their Top 40 organizations
in Germany with respect to private donation inflow.5 The DfDC operates in
several countries, and their work is almost identical in any country (primary
health care). In 2007, they asked for donations to support five countries,
namely Bangladesh, India, the Philippines, Kenya and Nicaragua.
Method: We used the DfDC's winter mailing campaign 2007 for our field
ingness to pay to save a group of species (reptiles) in a given area is lower then for saving
only a specific species (turtles) out of that group in the same area.
4Otherwise, observing a donor choosing a particular country might also be due to a
difference in the charity's activities in that particular country. This, of course, might be
interesting as well, but is beyond the scope of the present paper.
5cp. DZI Spendenalmanach 2008/9 p. 317; for more information (in German) see the
German Institute for Social Issues (DZI ) at http://www.dzi.de
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experiment. Together with the organization, we developed two treatments.
In the baseline treatment, donors could not choose their donation recipient.
Instead  as in the previous winter mailings  each donation was equally
split between the five countries. In the choice treatment, donors could de-
clare which country (or countries) should receive the donated amount; the
default being to support all five countries equally6. In both treatments, the
solicitation letter included a cover letter and a single remittance slip which
had the account and bank number pre-printed on it. The pre-printed account
numbers differed between treatments so that we know for each donor his or
her corresponding treatment.
The same cover letter was used in both treatments. It explained the project
work of the organization during the last year and mentioned the five coun-
tries for which they asked for donations in 2007. Thus, information about
the countries provided by the experimenter were identical between treat-
ments. The only difference in the cover letter was that a section was added
in treatment choice in which the choice-option was explained. Additionally,
a second page was added where the procedure to donate to a specific country
was explained in detail: By entering five digit codes in the reference-field
on the remittance slip, subjects were able to pick any (combination) of the
five countries to donate to. If a single code was entered, the entire donated
amount went to the recipient that the donor had selected. If more than one
code was entered, the donated money was to be split equally between the
selected countries. If no code was entered, the donation was treated as in
treatment baseline, i.e. the allocation decision was left to the organization.
Altogether, 57,372 letters were sent out between November 28th to 30th 2007
6More precisely, in that case (as in treatment baseline) the organization decided how
to allocate the money between the five countries.
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to the regular donors (`house list') and members of the DfDC. Allocation of
subjects to treatment was random. 30,325 people received the choice letter,
and 27,407 people received the baseline letter. The observation period ended
January 31st 2008.
Predictions: If donors just give out of pure, unconditional altruism, we
should not expect to observe any difference between treatments. Yet, if
other-regarding preferences are reference-group dependent (as it is the case
in many economic models of social preferences, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk and Fischbacher (2006)), or identifiability-
based as Bohnet and Frey (1999) call it, our treatment might affect donation
behavior. Donors who have more intense feelings for any of the five countries
might be expected to prefer this country over the other four countries and
consequently choose this particular country to be the donation recipient. One
should therefore hypothesize donations to be higher in treatment choice than
in baseline. Since donors in choice are not required to specify where their
money will be used, the design of the treatment should not lower donation
rates or donations of willing donors. On the contrary, it is imaginable that
potential donors could be won by the fact that a higher decision scope is
given which induces them to donate at all. Therefore, the response rate is
expected to be higher when the object of benevolence can be chosen.
One can also view our treatments from the perspective of the literature on
identifiable victims. As donors in treatment choice have the opportunity to
donate money to specific countries, this treatment can be seen as a selection
process. By selecting particular countries as donation recipients, the donation
cause is more `identifiable' to these donors  which in turn may induce them
to donate higher amounts. Of course, victims are not as explicitly identified
as it is usually the case in this area of research. Still, one could speak of a
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weak identifiability effect, because the donor reduces the reference group
from the whole population of five countries to a particular country.
3 Results
In this section, we will first look whether the response rate and the donated
amounts differ between treatments. Subsequently, we will explore the be-
havior of the donors who state a specific donation recipient. As will be seen,
those donors give significantly more on average. Finally, we shed light on the
question of causality by comparing the behavior of donors in 2007 to their
behavior in the preceding years.
Table 1: Donation behavior between treatments
Treatment Baseline Choice Total
# of letters sent 27,047 30,325 57,372
# of donations 3,166 3,521 6,687
Response rate 11.7 % 11.6 % 11.65 %
Total contributions 423,191e 481,940e 905,131e
Average donation 133.66e 136.87e 135.35e
Table 1 provides an overview of the donation behavior in the two treatments.
As can be seen, our data set includes 6,687 donation instances (observa-
tions).7 In treatment baseline, 3166 instances were recorded, compared to
3521 donations in treatment choice. The response rate is almost identical in
7We dropped 22 outliers from our dataset. These persons donated between 5,000 and
100,000e. Given the usual donation size, these are outstanding amounts; in particular
when considering that the 99th percentile is `only' 1500e. Their inclusion does not change
any of the reported significance levels qualitatively, but they bias the reported means. We
therefore believe that it is appropriate to drop them. Moreover, the treatment manip-
ulation is unlikely to impact those donation decisions. In particular, in none of the 14
donations which are dropped in treatment choice a specific country was selected.
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both treatment groups (approx. 11.7%, χ2-test, p = 0.7537, 2-sided). This
suggests that the increased decision scope in treatment choice does not affect
subjects' decision to become a donor.
Result 1: Providing donors with the possibility to choose their ob-
ject of benevolence does not affect subjects' participation rate. The
response rate does not differ significantly between treatments baseline
and choice.
The average donation size is slightly higher in treatment choice (136.87e)
than in treatment baseline (133.67e); the difference being insignificant (p =
0.9077, rank-sum test, 2-sided). This is likely to be driven by the fact that
only in 3.4% of the donations in treatment choice donors make use of their
option to state a donation target. However, those 120 donors who choose
their object of benevolence give on average 159.80e. If we compare this to
the average donation of subjects who did not state a recipient in treatment
choice (136.07e), the difference is highly significant (p = 0.0063, rank-sum
test, 2-sided). The same holds true if we compare it to the average donor in
treatment baseline (p = 0.0096). This suggests:
Result 2: There exists a positive correlation between specifying a
target for the donation and the size of the donation. Donors who
choose a recipient for their benevolence give more than donors who do
not select a particular country.
An important issue that needs to be considered is about causality. Are those
donors who choose a recipient more likely to give more; or are those who do-
nate higher amounts more likely to choose a recipient? To shed light on this
issue, the DfDC provided us with data from their previous winter-mailing
campaigns. The data contains an unique identification code for donors' ad-
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Table 2: Regression table: Donation behavior
Donation
2006 -3.38
(25.87)
2007 2.84
(25.60)
Chosen? -11.05
(226.60)
Chosen? x 2006 316.49
(224.18)
Chosen? x 2007 370.51*
(228.85)
constant 3142.22***
(28.21)
N 6126
R-sqr 0.0006
Notes: This table reports OLS-coefficient estimates and robust standard errors adjusted
for clustering in parentheses. 2006 and 2007 are dummy variables for the respective year.
Chosen? is a dummy variable which indicates whether the donor has chosen the object of
benevolence in 2007. Chosen?x2006 and Chosen?x2007 are interaction terms. Significance
levels are denoted as follows: ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
dresses that allows us to trace individuals' donation behavior across years.8
If we look at the 120 donors in treatment choice who choose a recipient, 74 of
them had already donated in 2005 and/or 2006. For these donors, we find no
significant effect in the absence of our treatment manipulations; i.e., they do-
nate similar amounts in 2005 and 2006 (130e vs. 140e, p = 0.7641, sign-rank
test, 2-sided). However, in 2007 when they can (and do) choose their object
of benevolence, they donate 202e on average  which is a highly significant
increase of 56% (44%) compared to what they gave in 2005 (2006).9
This is not observed for persons who did not choose a target country in
8To the best of our knowledge, the ability to rely on individual donation histories is
rarely given as most field experiments on charitable giving are one-shot-experiments.
92005 vs. 2007, p = 0.0004; 2006 vs. 2007, p = 0.0002, sign-rank test, 2-sided
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treatment choice: 2250 of them did already donate in the previous years,
and their donations are almost identical across years (2005: 144e, 2006:
141e, 2007: 145e). Moreover, while we saw above that there is a significant
difference in the donation amounts of donors who chose a recipient and those
who did not choose a recipient in 2007, this does not hold true if we compare
their donations in 2005, resp. in 2006 (2005: 130 vs 144e, p = 0.4264; 2006:
140 vs 141e, p = 0.2926; rank-sum test, 2-sided). We can thus deduce that
their donation only differs from those of other donors if they can choose
their target country, i.e., in 2007 (cp. also the regression results reported in
Table 2: the coefficient of the interaction term between a dummy indicating
whether you have chosen your recipient in 2007 and a dummy indicating the
contribution's year is only significant in 2007). This leads us to conclude:
Result 3: If donors can choose their object of benevolence, those
donors who select a recipient donate significantly higher amounts than
they might have done otherwise.
4 Conclusion
We conducted a randomized field experiment to study whether donation
behavior changes if donors can choose their object of benevolence. The
Doctors for Developing Countries sent out more than 57,000 solicitation
letters by mail in two different versions. In the one version, potential donors
could donate to the organizations' main purpose only - the project work
in five different developing countries. The other version provided donors
with the possibility to select one or more particular countries as donation
recipients. We found that only a minority makes use of this possibility 
but those donors who do use it give significantly more on average. Moreover,
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comparing their donation behavior across years, the data suggest that the
effect indeed seems to be due to our treatment manipulation.
Our results have interesting implications. First, they are interesting for char-
itable organizations who make use of mailing campaigns. Our results suggest
that providing donors with the option to choose their donation recipient can
increase total donations. A likely explanation might be that this design al-
lows donors who have more intense feelings towards a particular country to
express this feeling. However, we also see that many people prefer to share
their donations equally among the target countries instead of choosing a
single recipient. This might reflect a reluctance to consider the important
tradeoff whom to help. In future research, it might be interesting to see
what happens if donors are forced to make a decision, and/or if donors can
state multiple amounts (e.g., by including multiple remittance slips in the
solicitation letter) instead of choosing only a single donation amount.
Second, our findings are of importance for the literature modeling altruistic
preferences, or social preferences in general. They underline that such pref-
erences are not necessarily generic but instead depend on the situation and
persons at hand something which is taken into account in several models by
using the concept of reference groups, but which is frequently neglected when
using or talking about these models. For example, the models on altruism
usually ignore that helping behavior is (at least partly) identifiability-based.
It might be worthwhile to incorporate this fact in future models, and we hope
that this helps to gain a better understanding of altruistic motivation and
behavior.
Third, our result that subjects' valuation can be higher for a subset than for a
more inclusive target might be of great interest to those who use contingent-
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valuation methods. Complementing the existing work in this area, we demon-
strate that even in actual decision situations, people sometimes act as if their
preferences were non-additive. Taking our findings one step further, they
might even be of interest for scholars working in the area of public finance.
For example, citizens' willingness to pay duties or taxes might increase if they
were given the choice about what happens with their money afterwards. Of
course, this implication is strongly hypothetical at the moment. Moreover, it
runs counter the basic idea of funds provided by taxation being not targeted
to a specific purpose or function. However, one might think about combining
an uncommitted tax with a menu of committed duties on top of it to choose
from. This promises to be an interesting application and field for future
research.
One last thing to point out is the timely aspect of the donation.10 In all
three years, we find that most donations are made in the two subsequent
weeks after donors received the appeal for funds. Interestingly, however, the
average donation amount is highest in the time period between Christmas and
New Year's Eve. In fact, it is about 60% higher than the donations received
in the December and January weeks before and afterwards. While more
research and experiments are needed to answer the question about causality
here, still charities might think about focussing or increasing their effort to
raise funds around the Christmas days to benefit from this effect. Moreover,
if we hypothesize that the increased donation size in this time period is
due to people being in a more emotional condition during Christmas, this
last finding further underlines the link between altruistic motivations and
emotions.
10Details are provided in the appendix.
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Appendix
Donation development over time
Figure 1 reports the development of the average donation size (top table) and
the number of donations (bottom table) per week during the winter mailings
in 2005, 2006 and 2007.
Figure 1: Donation development over time
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The date that we consider (and that we have in our data set) is the date when
the organization receives the donation on its bank account. The intervals in
the figure are chosen as follows: In each year, the fourth bar marks the week
between Christmas and New Year's Eve (24th − 31th of December). Bars 1,
18
2, and 3 contain the donations that are received in the third to last, second
to last, resp. last week before the 24th of December. Each of these three
weeks start on a Monday, i.e., the number of days in the last week before
Christmas varies between years (depending on Christmas' weekday). The
fifth bar contains all donations that are received on New Year or thereafter.
Interestingly, in all three years the average donation size is highest in the
days between Christmas and New Year's Eve (bar 4). The peak in this time
period is remarkable. In 2007, the average donation size in this particular
week is about 71% higher than in all remaining weeks before and after (2005:
62%, 2006: 47%). In each year, this difference is highly significant.11
Of course, one would need a new field experiment or more extensive data to
distinguish whether donors get more generous because they donate in this pe-
riod, or whether generous donors are just more likely to donate in this period.
In either case, our finding might motivate charitable organizations to bundle
their vigor more extensively around the Christmas days, e.g., by launching
an additional appeal for funds just before Christmas. If the underlying rea-
son for the observed peak is that generous donors are more likely to give in
that particular period, a charitable organization's additional effort might get
those donors to donate for their organization rather than for another one.
If instead donors get more generous if they donate in that time period, the
additional appeal for funds might raise the number of donations received be-
tween Christmas and New Year's Eve (which otherwise is rather low in that
particular period, as we can see from the bottom table in figure 1). A simple
projection for the 2007 winter mailing illustrates this last point: if all people
11We compare the donations received between Christmas and New Year's Eve to the
donations received in the time periods that corresponds to the respective bars, i.e., 4 vs. 1,
4 vs. 2, 4 vs. 3 and 4 vs. 5. Using a rank-sum test, all obtained significance levels are
p < 0.001 (two-sided); except for the comparison in 2006 between 1 and 4 (here, p < 0.005).
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that did donate outside the peak-week would shift their donation into that
week and donate the average amount that we observed in that period (thus
increasing their donation by 71.1%), the outcome of the organization might
increase by more than 50% or, in monetary units, by 500.000e.
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